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CAN THE TAXMAN “TAX YOUR TEARS”: MURPHY v. I.R.S. AND 
THE INCLUSION OF PERSONAL INJURY COMPENSATION IN 
“INCOME”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps Benjamin Franklin said it best, “In this world nothing can be said 
to be certain, except death and taxes.”2  This old adage is grounded in reality, 
as conventional wisdom holds that Congress has plenary taxing power,3 firmly 
 
 1. The title is adapted from the opening line of Professor F. Patrick Hubbard’s article, 
Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for 
Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725 (1997). 
 2. THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN VOL. X 69 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., Norwood 
Press 1907) (1789). 
 3. See, e.g., Douglas Kahn, The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for 
Mental Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 128, 135 
(1999); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 100 (1990): 
A constitutional definition of income in terms of tax equity would recognize that as long 
as Congress is striving to impose a tax based on the relative annual financial positions of 
taxpayers, according to its concept of fairness, the Court should not overturn its 
determination.  The sixteenth amendment [sic] should be read as authorizing just such a 
legislative exercise . . . . Under such an approach the concept of income would be an 
elastic one, since it could accommodate virtually any congressional definition of income. 
Marjorie Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 
25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992): 
Given the broad underlying purpose of the taxing power generally, a proper reading of the 
Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully vested power to tax all income, 
however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine distinctions.  Such an 
interpretation yields a meaning of income that is broad and evolutionary.  Income's 
meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court, and that meaning changes over 
time as congressional conceptions of income change and become more sophisticated.  A 
broad definition of income also harmonizes with the Court's understanding of the balance 
of power among the three branches of government and its vision of the judiciary's 
function in a regulatory state as one of deference to the legislative and executive branches. 
But cf. Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2001) (arguing that conventional wisdom, which says 
that Congress’s power to tax is plenary, is in fact erroneous, at least insofar as one contends that 
Congress may arbitrarily define income as it sees fit).  See also Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 
(1929) (“[T]he Sixteenth Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as 
income without apportionment something which theretofore could not have been properly 
regarded as income.”). 
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entrenched in the Constitution as Congress’s first enumerated power.4  Further, 
the Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power “to lay and collect taxes 
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment.”5  
Therefore, when a three-judge panel of the prestigious Federal D.C. Circuit 
declared unconstitutional 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2)6 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(the Code), tax lawyers, constitutional law professors, and even President Bush 
were astounded.7 
The case was Murphy v. I.R.S., and the issue was whether Congress has the 
constitutional authority to tax non-physical personal injury compensation.8  In 
a unanimous decision by a three-judge panel of the Federal D.C. Circuit, 
written by Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg,9 the Circuit Court Panel held that 
Congress cannot tax, under its Sixteenth Amendment taxing powers, monies 
given as compensation for nonphysical personal injuries.10  In Murphy, the 
plaintiff, Ms. Marrita Murphy, challenged whether the I.R.S. could tax $70,000 
she received in 1994 from an administrative law judge (ALJ) for personal 
injuries.  She sustained the injuries as a result of blowing the whistle on sexual 
harassment occurring by her former employer, the New York Air National 
Guard (NYANG).11  The ALJ granted her $45,000 as compensation for 
“emotional distress or mental anguish” and $25,000 for “injury to professional 
reputation.”12 
After paying taxes on the full $70,000, approximately $20,665, Murphy 
sought a refund on the ground that her compensatory awards were either non-
taxable under § 104(a)(2) of the Code, or that § 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional 
 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 6. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000) (“[G]ross income does not include . . . the amount of any 
damages . . . received . . . on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness . . . .”). 
 7. See Sheryl Stratton, Experts Ponder Murphy Decision’s Many Flaws, 112 TAX NOTES 
822, 822 (Sept. 4, 2006).  See also Lee Sheppard, Murphy’s Law: Tax Provision Declared 
Unconstitutional, 112 TAX NOTES 825, 825 (Sept. 4, 2006); Allen Kenney, Murphy a Boon for 
Protesters, Critics Say, 112 TAX NOTES 832, 832 (Sept. 4, 2006); Marcia Coyle, Full Court May 
Weigh Taxation of Damages, 29 NAT’L L.J. 1, 1 (October 30, 2006). 
 8. Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2006) vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. July 
3, 2007). 
 9. No family relation exists between Chief Judge Douglas Ginsburg and current Supreme 
Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  Also, there exists no relation between Chief Judge Ginsburg 
and Justice Bader Ginsburg’s husband, the eminent tax scholar Martin Ginsburg.  Recall, 
however, that Chief Judge Ginsburg was nominated by President Ronald Reagan to fill the 
vacancy of retiring Justice Powell on the Supreme Court in 1987, but later withdrew his 
nomination.  See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 104, 121, 173–74 (2005). 
 10. Murphy, 460 F.3d at 92. 
 11. Id. at 81. 
 12. Id. 
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because compensatory awards for personal injuries are not income under either 
the statutory or constitutional meaning of the word.13  In its initial decision, the 
panel agreed with Murphy on the latter point and struck down as much of § 
104(a)(2) of the Code as it thought granted Congress the ability to tax personal 
injury compensation.14  The panel struck down the statute after finding that 
Murphy’s compensation was not paid in lieu of something ordinarily taxable 
and that such compensatory awards are not income within the reach of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.15 
On December 22, 2006, the three-judge Murphy panel vacated its earlier 
decision and scheduled re-arguments for the government and Murphy.16  On 
rehearing, Chief Judge Ginsburg and the other panel members made an about-
face and upheld the tax against Murphy, bowing to the political and academic 
pressures of Bush administration lawyers, the I.R.S., and other tax groups.17  
Even though the initial Murphy decision was vacated and eventually 
overturned, the original decision should not be downplayed.  The immediate 
reverberations that occurred after the initial decision, and the dusting off of tax 
principle books and the Sixteenth Amendment itself indicate that time is ripe to 
revisit exactly how and why Congress taxes personal injury compensation. 
This Comment will use the Murphy decisions only tangentially, as a spring 
board into the question of whether compensatory personal injury awards are, or 
should be, taxable under the Sixteenth Amendment.  In discussing the 
taxability of personal injury compensation, this Comment will not distinguish 
between physical and nonphysical personal injury compensation, unless 
explicitly mentioned otherwise.  While specific holdings and reasoning from 
Murphy will be discussed at different points, this Comment primarily addresses 
two alternative theories under which personal injury compensation may not be 
taxable: human capital and fairness principles.  As a final disclaimer, this 
Comment is concerned with compensatory damage status as income and will 
not, therefore, delve into questions of direct versus indirect taxation and 
transfer-transaction taxation of personal injury compensation.18 
Section II begins by touching on reasons for the current controversy 
regarding personal injury compensation and its tax/non-tax status.  Next, 
Section III discusses the history of the Sixteenth Amendment, the concept of 
 
 13. Id. at 170. 
 14. Id. at 92. 
 15. Id. 
 16. D.C. Circuit to Rehear Whistleblower’s Tax Case, BNA’s Daily Labor Report No. 249, 
Taxes, December 29, 2006, at A9. 
 17. Murphy, 493 F.3d at 170. 
 18. The Murphy decision implicates other principles of taxation, besides the income tax, 
such as a debate concerning direct-indirect taxes and classifying personal injury income as 
something other than an income tax.  The breadth of this comment is therefore limited solely to 
issues of income taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment and I.R.C. § 61 (2007). 
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income, and the personal injury compensation exclusion.  Finally, Section IV 
analyzes, partially through the history just discussed, whether the Sixteenth 
Amendment’s concept of income includes compensation given to personal 
injury victims.  Section IV applies the various theories of income discussed in 
Section III to personal injury compensation.  This Comment concludes that 
personal injury compensation is not, and should not, be included in the concept 
of income, and therefore Section IV will include a look at the human capital 
and fairness rationales for excluding such compensation from the statutory and 
constitutional meanings of income. 
II.  REASONS FOR THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY 
While many tax attorneys and commentators harshly criticized the Murphy 
panel for its initial decision,19 the debate in Murphy over personal injury 
compensation is timely and appropriate.  The legality of taxing personal injury 
compensation has been insulated for nearly eighty years even though it touches 
the very heart of America’s modern tax system, including the vital concepts of 
income, capital, and basis.  Whether or not one agrees with the way the 
Murphy court resolved the issues in its earlier or later decisions is one’s own 
opinion, but the fact remains that after eighty years in insulation, it is time to 
revisit the continuing rationale for the personal injury tax exclusion. 20 
One of the biggest reasons for the dispute regarding the taxability of 
nonphysical personal injuries is the long-standing tradition of not taxing these 
types of compensatory awards.  Almost since the beginning of the modern tax 
code, passed after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the Code 
has included a provision that exclude from gross income amounts received as 
compensation for personal injuries.21  In statutory form, the exclusion was 
codified as § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, which is substantially the 
same as the current § 104(a)(2) exclusion.22  Until 1996, § 104(a)(2) excluded 
 
 19. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 20. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 1060–61. 
 21. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6). 
 22. Id.  Specifically, the act stated that gross income did not include, and therefore exempted 
from taxation “[a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s 
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any 
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.” Id.  In 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the exception became § 22(b)(5) which excluded from gross 
income “[a]mounts received, through accident or health insurance or under workmen’s 
compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any 
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness.”  I.R.C. § 
22(b)(5) (1940).  In 1954, § 22(b)(5) was replaced by § 104(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1954 to 
its more or less current form (which was amended slightly in 1989 and 1996) and excluded from 
gross income “the amount of any damages received . . . on account of personal injuries or 
sickness.” I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954).  Finally, in 1996, I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was amended to its 
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from gross income any awards given to compensate a victim of personal 
injuries or sickness, regardless of whether the injuries or sickness were 
physical, nonphysical, lost wages, loss of consortium, or emotional and 
included defamation, liable, assault and battery, worker’s compensation, and 
employment discrimination.23 
The impetus for the current debate came in 1996 when Congress, as part of 
the Small Business Protection Act of 1996, departed from its seventy-eight 
year history of excluding nonphysical injury compensation by amending I.R.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) to only exclude compensation for personal physical injuries from 
gross income.24  In so doing, Congress made nonphysical personal injury 
compensation taxable, in particular those damages for emotional distress not 
derived from physical injury.  The amendment made taxable a new class of 
compensation that was untaxed for decades, particular discrimination-type 
cases dealing with emotional distress.25 
Another reason for the current debate (discussed in more detail in Section 
IV) is Congress’s original justification for creating the exclusion.  In 1918, 
Congress was wary about the constitutionality of taxing compensatory 
damages as income under the Sixteenth Amendment, which was still in its 
infancy.26 
 
present-day controversial form with the addition of the word “physical” in front of the words 
“injuries or “sickness.”  I.R.C § 104(a)(2) (1954). 
 23. See, e.g., Redfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 940 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding age discrimination damages awarded to terminated employees are tort-type recoveries 
for personal injuries that are excludable from gross income); Threlkeld v. C.I.R., 848 F.2d 81 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that compensation for malicious prosecution and harm to professional 
reputation constituted damages received on account of personal injuries and were exempt from 
gross income); Bent v. C.I.R., 835 F.2d 67 (3d. Cir. 1987) (holding damages received from an 
assault claim were excludable from taxable income as damages received for personal injuries); 
Roemer v. C.I.R., 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding defamation is a personal injury and 
compensatory damages received by taxpayer exempt from income). 
 24. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2007).  The 1996 amended/added portions are italicized as follows: “the 
amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received . . . on account of personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness” (emphasis added). Id. at §104(a)(2).  Further, the Act 
included an amendment stating that, “[f]or purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not 
be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.  The preceding sentence shall not apply to an 
amount of damages not in excess of the amount paid for medical care.” (emphasis added).  Id.  
Clearly, Congress’s explicit goal in the amendment was to make emotional distress type 
compensation taxable, probably out of some primitive pre-20th century belief that psychological 
trauma is not as devastating as physical trauma.  See generally Patrick Hobbs, The Personal 
Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical but Leaves the Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 
NEB. L. REV. 51 (1997). 
 25. Hobbs, supra note 24, at 83. 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 9–10 (1918) (“Under the present law it is doubtful whether 
amounts received through accident or health insurance, or under workmen’s compensation acts, 
as compensation for personal injury or sickness, and damages received on account of such 
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A third impetus, related to but distinct from the above reasons (also 
discussed in greater detail later in this comment), is the divergence of the 
concept of income from its 1918 conception to its present day meaning.  While 
the concept of income under the Sixteenth Amendment has gradually (and not 
so gradually) changed over time,27 the physical injury compensation exclusion 
remained unchanged for nearly 80 years.  Therefore, the constitutionality of 
taxing personal injury compensation in 1918 must be distinguished from the 
constitutionality of taxing personal injury compensation today.28 
Given the reasons for the current controversy mentioned above, one may 
wonder why ten years passed before this issue reached prominence instead of 
asking how the D.C. Circuit missed the mark so badly.29  With the reasons for 
the current controversy set forth above, a full and accurate analysis of these 
issues requires a look at the history of the Sixteenth Amendment, of the 
concept of income (as set forth by the Sixteenth Amendment and in § 61 of the 
Code), and finally of the personal injury exclusion. 
III.  HISTORY 
A. History of the Sixteenth Amendment 
Some of the controversy over the meaning of income and the 
constitutionality of taxing personal injury compensation comes from the 
tenuous history of the Sixteenth Amendment itself.  The Sixteenth Amendment 
reads: 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.30 
Ratified in 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was actually Congress’s rebuff to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in two cases which held the 1894 Income Tax 
Act unconstitutional.31  The two cases, collectively called the Tax Cases,32 
 
injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross income.  The proposed bill provides that 
such amounts shall not be included in gross income.”).  See also infra Part III.C. 
 27. See infra Part III.B. 
 28. See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
 29. Around the time of the Small Businesses Recovery Act of 1996, there was a small 
proliferation of law review articles on this very general topic, but the Murphy case and the 
presence of this debate in courts is partly what makes this discussion again necessary.  See, e.g., 
Kahn, supra note 3; Jensen, supra note 3; Hobbs, supra note 24; Hubbard, infra note 141. 
 30. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 31. Jensen, supra note 3, at 1058. 
 32. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (holding that tax on income 
from real property was direct tax under Article I and therefore required apportionment among the 
states); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan  Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (extending direct tax principle 
to income derived from personal property). 
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invalidated sections of the 1894 Income Tax Act as unconstitutional under 
Article I of the Constitution because the Act imposed a  direct tax on property 
that was not apportioned according to census.33  Prior to the Court’s rulings in 
the Tax Cases, Congress’s income taxing power had not been seriously 
challenged.34 
Despite the Court’s invalidation of the 1894 income tax, strong language 
inside the Tax Cases, as well as cases decided shortly thereafter, hinted at a 
potential future reversal by the Court.35  Subsequent cases validated certain 
types of income taxes on other premises, including: the privilege of doing 
business, employments, and profits from businesses and corporations.36  Many 
in Congress at the time of the Tax Cases felt that, given an opportunity, the 
Supreme Court might overrule its prior decisions in the Tax Cases.37 
However, rather than risk the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court 
or an inter-branch fight between Congress and the Judiciary, President Taft and 
moderate as well as radical members of Congress decided instead to propose 
an amendment to the Constitution to allow an unimpeded income tax.38  That 
proposal carried the day, and the Amendment was approved in Congress and 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.  “No Capitation, or other direct Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.” Id. 
 34. In fact, an income tax was used to finance the Civil War, and that income tax was 
explicitly upheld as an indirect tax and not in need of apportionment.  Springer v. United States, 
102 U.S. 586 (1880) (holding that an income tax is not a direct tax in the constitutional sense and 
therefore need not be apportioned; direct taxes are limited to real property and capitation taxes). 
 35. There was strong language in the Tax Cases, and also in the years following the Tax 
Cases, that certain income taxes were considered by the Court as indirect and therefore within 
Congress’s Article I taxing powers.  Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635.  In dictum, the Court essentially 
distinguished the Tax Cases from Springer by noting, “[w]e have considered the act only in 
respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and 
not so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view . 
. . [where such taxes have] assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such.” Id.  
See also Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 150 (1911) (holding that a tax on net corporate 
income was not a direct or income tax, but instead an excise tax, and therefore within Congress’s 
Article I taxing powers). 
 36. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 601 (1895); see also Flint, 220 U.S. at 107 (1911). 
 37. Jensen, supra note 3, at 1107–08. 
 38. See id. at 1108–14.  Reading the historical view of Professor Jensen is time-well-spent 
and gives an insight into American politics at the turn of the 19th century.  In his article he puts 
forward the view that many conservatives “embraced” a constitutional amendment proposal, as 
opposed to challenging the Pollack decisions by passing an income tax act identical to that of 
1894, precisely because they opposed a Federal income tax and were certain such an amendment 
process would in fact fail once sent to the states.  As Jensen purports, those politicians 
underestimated the support for progressive taxation, and instead helped to permanently enshrine 
the income tax into the Constitution itself (regardless of whether such a tax was already allowable 
as an indirect tax; now not even the Supreme Court could rule such “income tax” as requiring 
apportionment). 
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sent to the states in 1909; by 1913 forty-two states had ratified the Sixteenth 
Amendment.39 
Thus, it is apparent that both before and after the passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment, debate existed as to whether the Amendment was actually 
necessary to give Congress the constitutional ability to tax incomes.40  Because 
the Sixteenth Amendment was passed without first challenging the Tax Cases 
in the Supreme Court, those cases are still technically the foremost and 
controlling interpretation of Congress’s income taxing powers, the Sixteenth 
Amendment aside.  Therefore, this comment will assume (maybe 
controversially) that any tax purporting to be one on income must pass the 
rigors of the Sixteenth Amendment to be held constitutional as an income tax 
(as opposed to an excise tax, for example). 
B. History of the Meaning of “Incomes”   
1. Early Income: the “res” and Eisner v. Macomber 
The constitutional meaning of “income,” as used by Article I of the 
Constitution, the Sixteenth Amendment and statute,41 has undergone drastic 
changes throughout the years.42  After the Sixteenth Amendment extinguished 
the Tax Cases debate, the arguments then turned to what the term income 
would encompass.  Not-surprisingly, there was a proliferation of Supreme 
Court income cases in the few decades after passage of the Sixteenth 
Amendment.43  The Amendment’s text, “taxes on incomes, from whatever 
 
 39. Id. at 1123. 
 40. Id. at 1107–08. 
 41. It has long been held that Congress’s use of income in present-day I.R.C. § 61 and its 
predecessors goes to the full extent allowed by the Sixteenth Amendment, and income in the 
statutory sense is therefore equivalent to the constitutional use of income.  Helvering v. Clifford, 
309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940) (“The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Congress 
to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable categories.”). 
 42. The original statute that empowered Congress to tax income was in the Revenue Act of 
1916, § 2(a), which stated, “[t]he net income of a taxable person shall include . . . gains or profits 
and income derived from any source whatever.”  In form, this was changed into § 22(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which read, ”[g]ross [i]ncome includes gains, profits, and income 
derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in 
whatever form paid . . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”  
Finally, in the Internal Revenue Act of 1954, present-day § 61(a) succeeded § 22(a) to iterate the 
exact words of the Sixteenth Amendment, “all income from whatever source derived.”  
Throughout this whole process of revising the income statutes, it was acknowledged that each 
“definition [was] based upon the 16th Amendment and the word ‘income’ is used in its 
constitutional sense.”  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.11 (1955). 
 43. See, e.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., 247 
U.S. 179 (1918); S. Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918); Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920); 
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Merchants’ Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 
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source derived” proved difficult, if not impossible, to clearly define and 
demarcate as the Court (especially in the time immediately proceeding 
ratification of the amendment) scrambled to put parameters on the term.44 
American income tax theory was still young and not fully developed at the 
time of the Sixteenth Amendment, borrowing various aspects of its body from 
other academic and legal fields, especially trust law which today still makes 
strong (but probably artificial) distinctions between the body of a trust (the 
corpus) and the income of a trust.45  Subsequently, the Court’s view of income 
at the time of the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 is largely 
considered to correspond, albeit imperfectly, with the res distinction that 
existed (and still exists) in trust law.46  This understanding of income made the 
sharp distinction between capital and income, just as trust law makes the sharp 
distinction between corpus and income.47  The corpus, or original endowment 
and capital, was not taxable.48  Windfall receipts of cash, such as gifts, were 
viewed as additions to capital or endowments, and therefore distinct from 
income.49  As in trust accounting, sale of capital would remain capital under 
this theory, as would any appreciation of the property.50  The income stemming 
from the corpus (either figuratively as in trust terms, or as labor, as in the 
human corpus) was income; this included such receipts as investment interest, 
wages, and production income. 
 
U.S. 509 (1921); Edwards v. Cuba Railroad Co., 268 U.S. 628 (1925); Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n 
v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926); Taft v. 
Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1928); Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934); Helvering 
v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 221 (1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940); Helvering v. 
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943). 
 44. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (emphasis added). 
 45. Joseph Dodge, The Story of Glenshaw Glass, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT 
TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES, 15, 32 (Paul Caron ed., 2003). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Marjorie Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of 
Realization, in TAX STORIES, 53, 65 (Paul Caron ed., 2003). 
 48. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (“The fundamental relation of ‘capital’ 
to ‘income’ has been much discussed by economists, the former being likened to the tree or the 
land, the latter to the fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied from springs, 
the latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time.”). 
 49. Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 65.  Cf. Dodge, supra note 45, at 32–33 (“the express 
exclusion of gifts and bequests received, impl[ies] that gifts, at least plausibly, would be classed 
as income in the absence of such an exclusion.”).  Of course, this conclusion by Professor Dodge 
is tenuous and merely one way of looking at the existence of a statutory exclusion.  Another way 
to look at the exclusion is that, to avoid confusion and ensure certainty, Congress added I.R.C. § 
22(b)(3) (1939) (which corresponds to present-day I.R.C. § 102 (2000) (excluding gifts from 
income). 
 50. Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 65. 
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Because the concept of income, at least in the Sixteenth Amendment’s use 
of the word, was brand new, different theories competed for what might be 
considered income, and courts partly created rules and exceptions ad hoc 
alongside Congress’s own exclusion-making ability.51  The res theory of 
income, was codified, albeit imperfectly, for many years to come in the 
renowned case of Eisner v. Macomber.52 
The landmark aspect of Macomber is the requirement that income be 
“realized,” or else it is not income under the Sixteenth Amendment.53  
However, another equally important holding was the Court’s characterization 
or defining of the term income as, “the gain derived from capital, from labor, 
or from both combined.”54  In Macomber, the Court discussed whether 
Congress, under the Sixteenth Amendment’s conception of income could tax a 
stock dividend by a corporation to one of its shareholders, Macomber.55  The 
Court held that Congress had no such power. 
In so holding, Macomber codified the trust law distinction between capital 
and income into the term income.  As set out by the Macomber Court: 
The fundamental relation of ‘capital’ to ‘income’ has been much discussed by 
economists, the former being likened to the tree or the land, the latter to the 
fruit or the crop; the former depicted as a reservoir supplied form springs, the 
latter as the outlet stream, to be measured by its flow during a period of time.56 
This definition closely resembled the trust law distinction between the corpus 
and income; in trust law, as with Macomber, if there is no “[growth], a gain, a 
profit . . . proceeding from the property, severed from the capital,” then there is 
no income.57  Under the Macomber definition, the broadest range of what is 
today considered income did indeed fall into the category of income; other 
things did not, such as windfall gains, including but not limited to, punitive 
damages,58 gifts,59 alimony,60 and probably compensatory awards for personal 
 
 51. A classic example of this ad hoc approach is the Court’s 1917 holding in Gould v. 
Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), that alimony transfer payments are “not income” under the 
constitutional meaning of the word.  Gould has subsequently been ignored by Congress in I.R.C. 
§ 71, now codified as I.R.C. § 61(a)(8), which explicitly includes alimony payments in gross 
income.  Technically, Gould has never been expressly overruled. 
 52. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see also Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 65–66. 
 53. Kahn, supra note 3, at 131 (“Macomber stands for the view that realization [i.e. 
severance of income from capital] is a constitutional requisite to having ‘income’ for purposes of 
the Sixteenth Amendment.”). 
 54. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. 
 55. Id. at 199. 
 56. Id. at 206. 
 57. Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
 58. Highland Farms Corp., v. Comm’r, 42 B.T.A. 1314, 1322 (1940). 
 59. But see Kornhauser, supra note 47. 
 60. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917). 
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injuries.61  Unlike the res theory, however, the Macomber definition of income 
included gains accruing from appreciation of capital assets.62 
This somewhat restrictive understanding of income (though more liberal 
than the res theory) survived in strong part until 1955, with the ushering in of 
what is often called the current state of the concept of income as explicated in 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass.63 
2. Modern Income Defined in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass with 
Haig-Simons 
The modern concept of income comes not from the earliest part of the 
century, but instead from the 1955 Supreme Court decision in Glenshaw Glass 
v. Commissioner.64  The issue in Glenshaw was whether then section 22(a) of 
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code65 authorized Congress to tax punitive 
damages awarded to the Glenshaw Glass Company in a prior anti-trust 
settlement.66  Although the case dealt solely with statutory construction, the 
Court noted that the statute’s language “was used by Congress to exert in the 
[income tax] field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’”67  In essence, the 
Court acknowledged, in sharp contrast to Macomber’s more limited definition, 
that the residual catch-all phrase of the statute, “or gains or profits and income 
derived from any source whatever,”68 evidenced the “intention of Congress to 
tax all gains except those specifically exempted.”69  In applying the catch-all 
phrase of the statute, the Glenshaw Court distinguished and essentially swept 
aside Macomber’s definition of income as merely “the gain derived from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined,”70 and declared that the Macomber 
 
 61. See infra Part IV.A. 
 62. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (“‘[T]he gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of 
capital assets.”). 
 63. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 64. Id.; see also Dodge, supra note 45, at 15 (“[Glenshaw] is considered a watershed case 
ushering in the modern era in thinking about ‘income’ issues.”).  Glenshaw is actually a 
collection of two cases regarding the taxability of punitive damages: Commissioner v. Glenshaw 
Glass Co. and Commissioner v. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. 
 65. I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939) (“‘Gross income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from 
salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in whatever form 
paid . . . or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”).  I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939)’s 
successor, I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000), states that “gross income means all income, from whatever 
source derived.” 
 66. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 427. 
 67. Id. at 429 (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)). 
 68. I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939). 
 69. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added). 
 70. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). 
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definition was “not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income 
questions.”71 
In a narrow view, the Court simply held that punitive damages awarded to 
a taxpayer were taxable as income under the meaning of section § 22(a) of the 
Revenue Act of 1939.72  In the broader view, however, the Court may have 
held two things.  First, it expanded the definition of income to include 
windfalls, which are often not derived from labor, capital, or either 
combined.73  This type of economic gain, under the narrower Macomber 
standard, had not been held as income under the Sixteenth Amendment, 
because it was not created by the taxpayer either as investment income or 
wages.74 
The second broader holding in Glenshaw could be a new theory of income, 
a modern and all encompassing view which would remove all niceties 
regarding what actually constitutes “income.”  It is this second broad holding 
that is commonly assigned to Glenshaw.75  The second approach gives very 
real power to the catch-all phrases of both the income statute and the Sixteenth 
Amendment’s “from whatever source derived” and “gains and income derived 
from any source whatever.”76  The Macomber Court was concerned with the 
source of the income in defining income itself (i.e., was the source of the 
proceeds from property or labor or both?  If not, no taxable income existed).  
Glenshaw swept aside this origin distinction.77 So long as a receipt is an 
“undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized and over which the taxpayer 
has complete dominion,” then it falls within the statutory, and therefore 
constitutional, meaning of income.78 
While Glenshaw went a long way in ridding the income definition of 
certain niceties, the exact parameters of the term under the Sixteenth 
Amendment are still not totally clear.79  After all, while Glenshaw stands for 
 
 71. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431 (citing Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468–69 
(1940)). 
 72. Id. (“Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and 
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion . . . .  And we find no such evidence of 
[congressional] intent to exempt [punitive damages from nonpersonal injuries].”). 
 73. Highland Farms Corp. v. Comm’r, 42 B.T.A. 1314 (1940) (holding punitive damages 
nontaxable). 
 74. Id. at 1322 (“A penalty imposed by law does not meet the test of taxable income set forth 
in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, as ‘the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion of 
capital assets. The respondent erred in adding the $10,000 punitive damages to petitioner's 
taxable income.”). 
 75. Id. at 30–31. 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see also I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939). 
 77. Dodge, supra note 44, at 30–31. 
 78. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431. 
 79. See, e.g., Thuronyi, supra note 3; Jensen, supra note 3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] CAN THE TAXMAN “TAX YOUR TEARS” 207 
the proposition that income in the statutory and constitutional sense is very 
broad, there is language even in that opinion that left the waters slightly 
muddied.80  The Murphy opinion picked up on the remaining muddiness, and 
despite the apparently clear language of Glenshaw, concluded that 
compensation for personal injury was not an “accession to wealth” or “gain.”81 
Since Glenshaw, however, the consensus appears to have become that 
income is equated, in a general sense, with the Haig-Simons model of 
income.82  The Haig-Simons model defines income as “the algebraic sum of 
(1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in 
the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the 
period in question.”83  Stated another way, it is consumption plus the change in 
accumulated wealth over the tax year.84 
Consistent with most generalities, the Haig-Simons formulation of income 
and the one that Congress uses are not identical.85  The Haig-Simons 
formulation of income would ideally include in taxable income many things 
that Congress chooses not to tax.86  Despite this apparent inconsistency, it has 
become at least the benchmark by which tax proposals are measured.  The 
Haig-Simons income formulation of taxation has in practice aligned with the 
apparent holding in Glenshaw more than any other theory of income.87  
 
 80. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at  432 n.8 (“The long history of departmental rulings 
holding personal injury recoveries nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a 
return of capital cannot support exemption of punitive damages following injury to property. . . .   
Punitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capital for taxation 
purposes.”). 
 81. Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006) vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 82. See Dodge, supra note 45, at 34 (professor Dodge does not really accept the notion that 
the Court adopted the Haig-Simons definition, per se, or even knew of its existence as a theory of 
economic income.  However, he concedes that in practice Glenshaw Glass has aligned the income 
tax more closely with the Haig-Simons conception of income than with any other concept); 
Jensen, supra note 3, at 1083; Thuronyi, supra note 3, at 46. 
 83. Thuronyi, supra note 3, at 48. 
 84. Id. at 46. 
 85. Dodge, supra note 45, at 34–35. 
 86. Imputed income, for instance, is not taxed by Congress, nor is it Constitutionally taxable, 
though many economists would include such income into any accurate measure of gross national 
productivity.  Furthermore, in the sense that imputed income changes the value of stored property 
rights in a year, or amounts created for personal consumption, it most certainly fits within the 
Haig-Simons conception of income.  The conclusion that imputed income is not income under 
Glenshaw is perhaps controversial, and some feel that the landmark case establishing this 
doctrine, Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co. would be decided differently today.  This Comment 
assumes, according to basic legal principles, that since Helvering has not been overturned or 
seriously challenged, that it is the law of the land, and imputed income is therefore not income in 
the constitutional sense. 
 87. Dodge, supra note 45, at 37. 
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Consistent with the broad language of IRC § 61(a), the Sixteenth Amendment, 
and Glenshaw, the Haig-Simons income formulation is very broad and appears 
to abolish many of the niceties adopted in Macomber.88  According to a strict 
Haig-Simons formulation of income, Congress would have unfettered taxing 
authority over gifts, imputed income and consumption of durable goods, etc.; 
these are things Congress chooses not to tax. 
Unfortunately, even the acclaimed Haig-Simons definition of income is not 
without its ambiguities.89  For instance, what exactly is the extent of 
“consumption” and “accumulation?”90  Does this imply that Congress may tax 
citizens who consume their leisure?  Does Glenshaw really purport to allow 
Congress to tax its citizens on the time they spend in front of the television?  
After all, our leisure time is measurable as the opportunity cost of not working.  
Of course it is ludicrous to think that the Sixteenth Amendment goes so far as 
to allow a tax on leisure time as “income,” but such a tax is not outside the 
Haig-Simons formulation. 
The Haig-Simons theory is actually an economic theory and not a legal 
one, and sometimes it breaks down when applied in the real world.91  For 
instance, what is wealth in tax terms?  In economic terms, wealth and income 
are inherently attached to vague and immeasurable notions of utility, which 
“recognize[] that fundamentally income is a flow of satisfactions, of intangible 
psychological experiences.”92  While one could, if one so wanted, ignore the 
economic theory aspect of Haig-Simons and define income as any receipts of 
cash or tangible goods or services, this rips the true theory from its economic 
underpinnings and is no truer a concept of income than the Macomber ad hoc 
approach.  In any event, these subtleties aside, the Haig-Simons analogy to 
Glenshaw is fairly uncontroversial.  However, as demonstrated above, it is not 
true that just because something is income in the Haig-Simons definition that 
Congress could tax it as such. 
C. The History of the Personal Injuries Exclusion 
Congress’s reasoning in passing the personal injury exclusion is a potential 
key in understanding how personal injury compensation awards should be 
treated for tax purposes, absent IRC § 104(a)(2).  Unfortunately, as this 
Comment soon makes clear, the reasoning behind the initial exclusion is 
unclear at best and faulty at worst.  Some courts, despite this muddled history, 
have relied on numerous departmental decisions and writings that were 
 
 88. Thuronyi, supra note 3, at 46. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 52. 
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interconnected with the legislative history of the personal injuries exclusion.93  
Those courts, based on their understanding of the history and correspondence, 
have sometimes made definitive holdings based on “Originalist” analyses of 
the Sixteenth Amendment in finding various personal injury compensation 
awards taxable or nontaxable under either IRC § 104(a)(2) or IRC § 61(a) or 
under the Sixteenth Amendment.94  Therefore, the history of the exclusion 
deserves exploration in order to understand not only the Murphy case, but as 
well as to fully understand the arguments for each side of the question of 
whether or not personal injury compensation is income under the statute and 
Constitution. 
1. Clear Origins but Muddled Rationale 
As established above, the exclusion from gross income of personal injury 
compensatory awards has a very long history in the tax code.  The predecessor 
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), I.R.C. § 213(b)(6), entered the Code in the Revenue Act 
of 1918, only five years after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.95  In 
the five years after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, but prior to the 
enactment of § 213(b)(6), the Treasury Department actually taxed 
compensatory personal injury awards.96  In fact, Treasury Regulation 33 of the 
Revenue Act of 1916 specifically provided for such taxation, stating that any 
“amount received as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury, 
being similar to the proceeds of accident insurance, is to be accounted for as 
income.”97 
Historical evidence shows, as Professor Hobbs argues, that the decision by 
the federal government to treat personal injury compensation as distinct from 
income arose in a 1918 opinion by the Attorney General to the Secretary of the 
Treasury.98  The Attorney General likened compensation for personal injuries 
to proceeds from accident insurance, which he then equated to a “return to 
 
 93. See generally Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 170, 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (relying on departmental rulings to invalidate I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); O’Gilvie v. 
U.S., 519 U.S. 79 (majority and dissenting opinions discussing the 1918 House Report, Treasury 
Decision, and Attorney General Opinion regarding personal injury compensation); Glenshaw 
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (mentioning the history of departmental ruling that deal with a return to 
capital policy underlying the personal injury exclusion). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6) (1918). 
 96. See Hobbs, supra note 24, at 56–57 (citing to 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39, 42 (1915), 
which stated, “An amount received as a result of suit or compromise for ‘pain and suffering’ is 
held to be such income as would be taxable under the provision of law that includes ‘gains or 
profits and income derived from any source whatsoever.’”). 
 97. Id. at 57 (citing Treas. Reg. 33, art. 4 (1918)). 
 98. 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918).  Subsequently, the Murphy panel relied heavily upon 
this opinion in concluding that personal injury compensation is not income in any constitutional 
sense.  Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79, 85–86, vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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capital.”99  The Attorney General then equated personal injury compensation to 
a restoration of human capital in the body.100  The Treasury Department soon 
revoked Treasury Regulation 33, which effectively repealed Treasury’s 
decision to tax personal injury compensation.101 
Thereafter, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1918, which codified the 
exclusion for personal injury awards into section § 213(b)(6) of the Code.  
Section 213(b)(6) excluded from gross income any “amount received . . . as 
compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any 
damages received . . . on account of such injuries or sickness.”102 
The legislative history regarding the exclusion is fairly sparse, save for one 
House Report.  The House Report concerning the Act contained the following 
statement, “[u]nder the present law it is doubtful whether amounts received 
through accident or health insurance, or under workmen’s compensation acts, 
as compensation for personal injury or sickness, and damages received on 
account of such injuries or sickness, are required to be included in gross 
income.”103  From there, the courts would determine the breadth of the 
exclusion. 
2. Courts Interpret the Statute to Include Physical and Nonphysical 
Injuries 
Until 1996, Congress never explicitly distinguished between physical and 
nonphysical injuries in reference to the personal injury exclusion.104  The 
Court’s interpretation of § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (and its 
successor IRC § 104(a)(2)) and Congress’s subsequent silence were the driving 
forces behind nonphysical injuries being equated with physical injuries for 
purposes of interpreting the personal injury exclusion, such as emotional 
distress or alienation of affections.105  With regard to the personal injury 
exclusion, the debate has been instead whether the compensatory damages 
were awarded “on account of” personal injury, which was restricted to tort or 
tort-type injuries, or whether punitive damages were included in § 104(a)(2).106 
 
 99. 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 307–08 (1918). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Hobbs, supra note 24, at 64 (citing 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918)). 
 102. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6) (1918). 
 103. H.R. REP. NO. 65-767 (1918). 
 104. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1954). 
 105. Hobbs, supra note 24, at 70. 
 106. See, e.g., O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996) (holding that punitive damages 
that accompanied a personal injury case did not compensate for personal injury); U.S. v. Burke, 
504 U.S. 229 (1992) (holding that back pay settlement originating in Title VII cases are not 
injuries “on account” of “personal injury”); Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) 
(settlements under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act do not constitute awards based on 
account of personal injury); Threlkeld v. C.I.R., 87 T.C. 1294 (1987). 
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Prior to 1989, some members of Congress attempted to have § 104(a)(2) 
restricted to physical injuries only, but their efforts failed.107  Ironically, 
Congress instead sanctioned a statutory merger of physical and nonphysical 
injuries to IRC § 104(a)(2).108  In 1996, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to its 
current form, essentially adding the word “physical” in front of the words 
“injury” and “sickness,” and explicitly denying “mental distress” injuries from 
being included in the definition of “injury” and “sickness.”109 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
With a brief history of the Sixteenth Amendment, the concept of income 
and the personal injury exclusion complete, it is now possible to analyze 
whether Congress, in accordance with its Sixteenth Amendment income tax 
allowance, can tax personal injury awards as income.  In the first subsection, 
this Comment briefly looks at whether, under the res and Macomber 
conceptions of income, personal injury damage awards would have been 
income.  This section then discusses the current state of the term “income” in 
light of Glenshaw and Haig-Simons and analyzes whether Congress’s income 
taxing powers encompass personal injury compensation according to those 
theories of income.  Next, this Comment looks at the human capital argument 
espoused as the earliest justification for the personal injury exclusion and 
evaluates its continuing role as a limitation on the income concept.  Finally, 
this section evaluates the personal injury exclusion according to a fairness 
standard and argues against taxing personal injury compensation. 
A. The Taxability of Personal Injury Damages Under Eisner v. Macomber 
and the Res Theory of Income 
It is at least worth a few pages to discuss whether compensatory damages 
would have been considered income at the time of Macomber.  For instance, 
the Murphy panel relied, at least in part, on the Macomber definition of income 
which consisted of proceeds generated from “capital, from labor, or from both 
combined,” when it invalidated IRC § 104(a)(2).110 
 
 107. See Hobbs, supra note 24, at 74 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 1355 (1989)). 
 108. See id. at 74–75. 
 109. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000). 
 110. Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79, 85, 88–89, vacated, 493 F.3d 107, (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]hen the Sixteenth Amendment was drafted, the word ‘incomes’ had well understood 
limits. . . .  [I]n defining ‘incomes,’ we should rely upon ‘the commonly understood meaning of 
the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth 
Amendment.”); see also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206–07 (“For the present purpose we 
require only a clear definition of the term ‘income’ as used in common speech, in order to 
determine its meaning in the [Sixteenth] Amendment.  ‘Income may be defined as the gain 
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.’”). 
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Applying the basic framework of Macomber, as well as some of the 
reasoning in Murphy, it is certainly possible, though not positive, that had 
Murphy been decided eighty years ago, Chief Judge Ginsburg would not be on 
the chopping block as he is today.  Applying the Macomber rationale to the 
compensatory damages in Murphy would likely result in a holding of no 
income. 
Compensatory awards are by their nature given to compensate victims for 
certain losses.111  In Murphy’s case, the compensatory awards were given 
partly in lieu of emotional distress.  In other instances, however, the loss is an 
arm, an eye, or other body part.  Human emotions, body parts and reputation 
are analogous to the res theory’s concept of capital, distinguishable from 
income in that they produce income but are not actually themselves income.112  
According to this analogy, because the compensation is merely a replacement 
of bodily or emotional capital, and not product of the capital, it would not be 
income under the early res articulation.113 
However, personal injury awards might be considered income under 
Macomber’s income analysis.  Macomber’s conception of income includes 
appreciation of capital assets once they are realized,114 unlike both the res 
theory115 and trust law.  In Murphy, as in all personal injury instances, the 
involuntary conversion of a person’s body parts or emotions are considered 
realization events,116 which according to Macomber would be a taxable 
event.117 
 
 111. See Murphy, 460 F.3d at 89 n.* (citing nearly two pages of cases dealing with personal 
injury compensation and “in lieu of what” it is awarded). 
 112. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 65 (explaining the res concept succinctly through 
the example: “[a] fruit tree might grow from a tiny seed, increasing in size and value, but at all 
times the entire tree—whether large or small—was capital.  Only the regular, periodic fruit of that 
tree was income.”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (“[A] gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value 
proceeding from  the property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and  
coming in, being “derived,” that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his 
separate use, benefit and disposal;--that is income derived from property.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 65 (explaining the res theory: “if a person [under 
the res theory of income] bought Greenacre for $100,000 and sold it some time later for 
$150,000, he had no income.”). 
 116. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1033(b)(2) (2000) (“If property (as a result of its destruction in whole 
or in part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof) is 
compulsorily or involuntarily converted into money or into property not similar or related in 
service or use to the converted property, the gain (if any) shall be recognized.”). 
 117. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207 (‘“Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, 
from labor, or from both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a 
sale or conversion of capital assets . . . .”) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 
185 (1919)). 
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However, this latter analysis under Macomber is flawed for two reasons.  
First, Macomber confined itself to a definition of income as the product from 
“capital, from labor, or from both combined.”118  Compensation for converted 
emotions or a severed arm is not really a “profit . . . proceeding from the 
property, severed from”119 the property, but is loosely speaking replacing the 
property.  Second, tax courts do not consider emotions or physical body parts 
to be either depreciable or appreciable property.120  Therefore, personal injury 
compensation cannot constitute an appreciation of capital assets under 
Macomber, either.121 
Interestingly, using either the strict res concept of income, or Macomber’s 
definition of income as “profit . . . proceeding from the property”122 
circumvents a discussion of the important tax concept of “basis.”123  Any 
modern discussion of income almost certainly must touch on the vastly 
influential basis idea.  This brings the Comment to an analysis of whether 
personal injury compensation is modern income under Glenshaw and Haig-
Simons. 
B. The Taxability of Personal Injury Compensation Under the Commissioner 
v. Glenshaw Glass Regime 
1. Background 
In 1955, Macomber’s definition of income, to large extent, was replaced 
when the Supreme Court released its landmark decision in Glenshaw.124  As 
mentioned above, Glenshaw held that Macomber “was not meant [to be the] 
touchstone to all future gross income questions.”125  Glenshaw then went on to 
prescribe the new test for defining income in the Sixteenth Amendment and 
statutory senses.126 
An effect of Glenshaw was the broadening of the concept of income to 
eliminate an analysis of the origin of the income.127  While the Macomber 
standard looked at whether a gain was created “from capital, from labor, or 
from both combined,” Glenshaw changed the question of whether the proceeds 
were an “undeniable accession to wealth, clearly realized and over which the 
taxpayer has complete dominion,” or “gains or profits and income derived 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 47, at 46. 
 124. See supra Part III.B.2. and sources cited therein. 
 125. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). 
 126. Id. at 431–33. 
 127. Dodge, supra note 45, at 30. 
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from any source whatever.”128  Therefore, when analyzing whether 
compensatory damage awards for emotional distress are income according to 
Glenshaw, the issue becomes whether an “undeniable accession to wealth” has 
occurred or not.  Because gain is the issue involved in a Glenshaw income 
analysis, the important concept of basis is essential for an intelligent and full 
discussion of personal injury compensation taxation. 
As Glenshaw stated, the income tax system works to ensure that 
individuals pay taxes on their “gains or profits . . . from any source 
whatever.”129  Courts have “given a liberal construction to this broad 
phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except 
those specifically exempted.”130  Most recently, the Court described IRC § 61 
as encompassing “all economic gains not otherwise exempted.”131  In tax 
terms, a gain is defined as, “the excess of the amount realized there from over 
the adjusted basis.”132  Basis is defined as “the cost of such property.”133  The 
point is that people are only taxed on the amount over which they spend on an 
item, and basis tracks the amount of post-tax dollars a taxpayer has spent on a 
particular item.  This system ensures, generally, that taxpayers are not taxed 
twice on their dollars.  With this brief introduction it is now possible to look at 
whether, under the modern theories, personal injury compensation is income. 
 
 128. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 430–31. 
 129. Id. at 429 (quoting I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939) (emphasis added)). 
 130. Id. at 430 (citing Comm’r v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949)). 
 131. Comm’r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 433 (2005) (holding that under anticipatory assignment 
doctrine, the taxpayer cannot exclude economic gain from gross income by assigning gain in 
advance to another party). 
 132. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (“The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be 
the excess of the amount realized there from over the adjusted basis [which equals cost plus 
additional post-tax expenditures on the property].”). 
 133. I.R.C. § 1012 (2000). 
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2. The Dominant View Regarding Taxability of Personal Injury 
Compensation; Glenshaw Glass and the I.R.S.’s Income Analysis in 
Murphy v. I.R.S. 
The dominant view of the taxability of personal injury compensation has 
been the I.R.S.’s view, which was espoused in Murphy.134  Not surprisingly, 
the I.R.S. view favors the inclusion of personal injury compensation in 
income.135  Using the Code, and the system espoused in the paragraph above, 
the normal process is to look at the value that has been realized from the 
transaction and offset that amount by any basis, or post-tax dollars, the 
taxpayer has invested in the item.136 
The first step is to calculate the amount realized.  In Murphy, the plaintiff 
received $70,000 in total compensation for her emotional distress and loss to 
professional reputation; $70,000 would then be her amount realized.137  After 
determining the amount realized, the next step in determining gain in the tax 
sense is to offset any amount realized by the taxpayer’s post-tax dollar 
expenditures in the property.138  The I.R.S. argued that Murphy’s basis was 
zero on the premise that Murphy did not “pay cash or its equivalent to acquire 
[her] well-being, [therefore she had] no basis in it for purposes of measuring a 
gain.”139  Accepting the I.R.S.’s argument that Murphy’s expenditures in her 
own emotional well-being and professional reputation are zero, she would have 
no tax basis with which to offset her $70,000 amount realized.  Therefore, her 
taxable gain or income is the full $70,000; this is exactly what the I.R.S. 
argued in Murphy as the “income from whatever source derived.”140 
Under an ad hoc Haig-Simons application to the personal injuries 
compensation, a similar, though less mechanical, result would occur.  In the 
non-economic, ad hoc fashion in which tax scholars analogize it, the Glenshaw 
and Sixteenth Amendment’s “incomes from whatever source derived,” 
Murphy’s $70,000 appears to be an accumulation in wealth of that exact 
amount.  Plus, because tax scholars give no fair market value for one’s leisure 
 
 134. Even though the I.R.S. did not carry the day, the analysis employed by the I.R.S. in 
Murphy is the dominant view held by scholars and tax experts.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 
7. 
 135. Brief for the Appellee, at 15–18, Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No.  
05-5139). 
 136. See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011, 1012 (2000) (sections explaining the legal definition of gain, 
basis, etc.). 
 137. See, e.g., Roemer v. Comm’r, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (money received as 
compensation for an injury to a person’s health and other personal interests is considered a 
realized accession to wealth). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Brief for the Appellee supra note 135, at 35–36. 
 140. Murphy, 460 F.3d 79, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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time or emotional well-being, per se, the fair market value of her consumption 
rights have not been diminished. 
A different result occurs, however, under the Haig-Simons argument, 
phrased in economic terms.  In that event, the economic value (in utility 
functions) of Murphy’s consumption rights decrease to the exact amount 
offsetting the increase in her accumulated wealth.  This equal offset is 
plausible because Murphy was personally injured and harmed emotionally, 
amounting to a decrease in her happiness and utility.  The idea of 
compensatory damages is to return the victim to the status quo, and this occurs 
in an economic Haig-Simons formulation.  Tax experts do not use the 
economic theory of Haig-Simons as much as the artificial tax one.  This 
analysis is not meant as a criticism of the Haig-Simons formula, but merely as 
a demonstration, again, that putting technical precise definitions to income 
might not be as easy as saying, “cash minus basis equals gain.” 
Of course, in order for the I.R.S.’s tax argument to work, there is an 
express assumption that Murphy could not offset any of her $70,000 amount 
realized with basis.  This very assumption is what came under fire in Murphy 
and in the following sections of this comment.  Some scholars have taken a 
similar stance as Murphy, advocating that compensatory damages should have 
a basis offset in the form of human capital or fairness-equity principles.141 
C. Countering the Taxability of Personal Injury Compensation with the 
Human Capital Rationale and Equity-Fairness Concepts 
1. Human Capital Theory 
a. Generally 
Aside from the statutory exclusion, a popular argument against taxing 
compensatory personal injury awards is that such awards are merely a return of 
human capital to the tort victims.142  The Code taxes income which is defined 
as “gains . . . from whatever source derived.”143  Gains are defined by the Code 
as the amount realized in a transaction over the amount of basis, or capital.144  
Proponents of the human capital argument equate personal injury 
 
 141. See e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The Constitutionality of 
Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725 (1997) (arguing 
that a tax on mental distress compensation is a capitation tax and/or it is not income because 
people have basis in their body, or in the alternative, basis is a totally inappropriate measure of 
human capital). 
 142. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant at 16–18, Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (No.  05-5139). 
 143. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000). 
 144. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2000). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] CAN THE TAXMAN “TAX YOUR TEARS” 217 
compensation to an amount necessary to “restore” an amount of personal 
human capital destroyed or taken by a particular liable party.145  In this context, 
proponents treat human capital synonymously with capital and basis for 
purposes of IRC § 1001. 
Murphy is a suitable illustration of the proponents’ argument.  In Murphy, 
Murphy presented the human capital argument146 and argued that she accrued 
no economic gain or “accession to wealth” from her compensatory awards.147  
The entire $70,000, she argued, was only supposed to restore whatever 
emotional and “reputational” capital she possessed prior to the NYANG’s 
wrongdoing.148  If accepted, Murphy’s argument would mean that whatever 
she realized as compensation for her emotional stress and diminished 
reputation would be completely offset as restoring capital, resulting in a zero-
sum (zero-gain) situation; this means no taxable income would accrue.  
Ultimately, the Murphy panel never explicitly ruled on the human capital 
reasoning, but chose instead to rely upon the Macomber theory that income 
equals proceeds from labor or capital.149  The panel opinion, however, 
appeared to largely agree with Murphy’s analogy.150 
b. Historical Underpinnings of the Human Capital Theory, As It Relates 
to the Exclusion for Personal Injury Compensation 
The human capital line of reasoning is nothing new, especially in relation 
to the personal injuries exclusion.  The history of and discussion of the 
personal injuries exclusion is infused and inseparable from the human capital 
rationale.  Human capital, with strong historical linchpins, may be the strongest 
argument against Congress’s ability to tax personal injury compensation.  The 
personal injury exclusion is largely based on the theory that such 
 
 145. Hubbard, supra note 141, at 764. 
 146. Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 88. 
 150. Id.  The Court also stated that: 
In any event, the Government’s quarrel with Murphy’s analogy, based upon Glenshaw 
Glass, of “human capital” to financial or physical capital is not persuasive.  To be sure, 
the analogy is incomplete; personal injuries do not entail an adjustment to any basis, nor 
are human resources, such as reputation, depreciable for tax purposes.  But nothing in 
Murphy’s argument implies a need to account for the basis in or to depreciate anything.  
Her point, rather, is that as with compensation for a harm to one’s financial or physical 
capital, the payment of compensation for the diminution of a personal attribute, such as 
reputation, is but a restoration of the status quo ante, analogous to a “restoration of 
capital,” in neither context does the payment result in a “gain” or “accession[] to wealth.” 
Id. at n.* (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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compensation, like accident insurance, is meant to restore a victim to his or her 
prior status quo.151 
The 1918 opinion of the Attorney General to the Treasury (discussed in 
Section III, above) is apparently the first official statement by any 
governmental department discussing the taxability of personal injury accident 
insurance at length.  By arguing that personal injury insurance proceeds were 
not gains, and therefore not income, the Attorney General endorsed a human 
capital analogy, albeit while saying he was not doing so: 
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the “capital” 
invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense the proceeds of the 
[personal injury accident insurance] do but substitute, so far as they go, capital 
which is the source of future periodical income.  They merely take the place of 
capital in human ability which was destroyed by the accident.  They are 
therefore ‘capital’ as distinguished from “income” receipts.152 
As discussed in Section III, the Treasury Department then issued Treasury 
Decision 2747, which stated that that personal injury accident insurance was 
not income, and thus would not be taxed as such.153  Shortly thereafter, 
Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1918 which essentially codified the 
Treasury Decision 2747, stating that “it is doubtful whether amounts 
received . . . as compensation for personal injury . . . [are] included in gross 
income.”154  With that history, it can hardly be doubted that the personal injury 
exclusion was based, at least partly, on a rough conception of personal injury 
compensation as a restoration of human capital, and outside of Congress’s 
ability to tax such proceeds as income.155 
Proponents of the human capital rationale also point to dictum contained in 
Glenshaw.156  In what has since become a controversial footnote, which 
appears to acknowledge the human capital rationale,157 Chief Justice Warren 
wrote: 
The long history of departmental rulings holding personal injury recoveries 
nontaxable on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital 
cannot support exemption of punitive damages following injury to property.  
 
 151. Hubbard, supra note 141, at 727 (arguing that compensatory damages work to make 
victims whole and do not substitute for normally taxable income, such as wages, and therefore are 
not income). 
 152. 31 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 304, 308 (June 26, 1918). 
 153. See Hobbs, supra note 24. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Cf. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 96–99 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 156. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellant, supra note 142, at 16–18. 
 157. Others have claimed that the Glenshaw footnote actually endorses the human capital 
rationale.  E.g. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 142. 
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Damages for personal injury are by definition compensatory only . . . 
considered a restoration of capital for taxation purposes.158 
In the Court’s 1996 opinion in O’Gilvie v. U.S., Justice Breyer named the 
human capital rationale as the “original focus” of the personal injury statute, 
“an important part of . . . if not the entirety of, the statute’s rationale.”159  
Distinguishing the punitive damages that oftentimes accompany personal 
injury compensation, Justice Breyer reasoned that punitive damages “are not 
‘designed to compensate ADEA victims.’”160  In fact, Justice Breyer’s 
O’Gilvie opinion goes on to recite the history of the personal injury exclusion 
and its human capital roots.  Justice Breyer cites, verbatim, the above excerpts 
from the Attorney General’s 1918 opinion, Treasury Decision 2747, and the 
House Report on the Revenue Act of 1918.161  This acceptance of human 
capital as the original and continual reason for the exclusion is apparent in 
numerous lower federal court decisions as well.162 
Despite the human capital rationale’s frequent mention in lower court 
decisions, the Supreme Court has never critically assessed the theoretical 
underpinnings of the human capital rationale or faced the issue of whether 
personal injury compensation is income under the constitutional meaning of 
the word.163  The only critical analysis of the theory done by an official source 
was the 1918 Attorney General’s opinion to the Treasury.164  As explained, a 
main reason for the lack of critical analysis between 1918 and 1996 was that, 
until 1996, Congress excluded all personal injury compensation by statute (first 
in § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 and then in IRC § 104(a)(2)), and 
 
 158. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 n.8 (1955) (citation omitted). 
 159. O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 86. 
 160. Id. at 84. 
 161. Id. at 84–86. 
 162. Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[The] human capital [rationale] 
continues to support the [I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)] exclusion”); see also Brooks v. United States, 276 
F.Supp.2d 653 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (“The rationale underlying such exclusion is the human capital 
principle.”); Starrels v. Comm’r, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962) (“Damages paid for personal 
injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a previous 
loss of personal rights--because, in effect, they restore a loss to capital.”). 
 163. See, e.g., O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 79 (1996) (dealing directly with punitive damages and an 
interpretation of I.R.C. § 104(a)); Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995) (dealing with a 
statutory interpretation of I.R.C. § 104, and whether § 104(a)’s language required a strong 
causation nexus in the words “on account of personal injury”); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 
229 (1992) (also dealing with statutory interpretation of I.R.C. § 104(a), interpreting the meaning 
of “tort or tort-type” in relation to Title VII cases).  See also Hubbard, supra note 141, at 741 
(“The Supreme Court has not had to address the issue of whether compensatory damages 
constitute income under the Sixteenth Amendment.  Instead, the Court has focused on matters of 
statutory interpretation.”). 
 164. 31 Op. Att’y Gen. 304, 308 (1918). 
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therefore no issues arose requiring a critical analysis of the exclusion’s 
constitutional necessity.165 
c. Human Capital, Theoretically Incompatible with Basis? 
Despite its facial appeal, the theoretical soundness of the human capital 
argument has come under strong criticism from tax professionals.  Even the 
Murphy panel did not use such a rationale in making its final decision.  In fact, 
opponents of the theory might consider the human capital theory a misnomer.  
As explained above, capital and basis are synonymous tax law terms, each 
used to keep a record of the amount of post-tax dollars expended on a 
particular item.166  Critics argue that the capital in human capital, however, 
does not really represent post-tax dollars, but merely a physical state or 
attribute.167  According to some, emotional well-being is an endowment which 
by itself has zero basis.168  With zero basis in emotional well-being, any 
compensation given to replace such an endowment will create a taxable gain 
equal to the full amount of compensation. 
This endowment concept is more apparent when describing physical 
human attributes.  For example, people do not buy their limbs, ears, or toes any 
more than they buy their emotional or mental health; they are endowed with 
them at birth.  Since no cost is exerted to acquire body parts, no initial basis, or 
capital, exists to offset a taxable gain should a victim be compensated for 
losing a limb or their mental happiness.169  Critics liken the compensation to a 
windfall gain, such as a lottery win, treasure trove, or one who receives a free 
sample.170  Furthermore, once these personal attributes are acquired, the cost of 
maintaining one’s limbs, ears, toes, and mental well-being (i.e., cost of food, 
water, shelter, education, etc.) are primarily personal expenses, disallowed by 
the Code.171  Therefore, any compensation for personal physical injuries, and 
 
 165. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 166. For example, a taxpayer pays $5,000 as an initial cost for an antique vase.  In tax terms, 
he has a basis, or capital, of $5,000.  Every time he expends more money on the vase, his basis 
(capital in the vase) goes up by that amount.  If his vase is destroyed when it is worth $6,000, and 
he is reimbursed by his insurance the entire value of $6,000, he will not be expected to pay taxes 
on all $6,000, but instead only on the difference between his adjusted basis (total capital) and the 
amount reimbursed, or realized, which is his gain for tax purposes.  In our example, he would 
then only be responsible for paying taxes on a $1000 gain. 
 167. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 133. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Hubbard, supra note 141, at 753. 
 171. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2000). 
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by implication emotional injuries is a gain, taxable unless otherwise exempted 
by the Code.172 
The critics of the human capital theory have mostly carried the day in 
court.  For instance, where taxpayers have sold their blood and attempted to 
exclude the proceeds from gross income, federal circuit courts have found 
exclusively for the I.R.S..173  Furthermore, where tax protestors have used a 
human capital rationale to oppose paying income taxes on their wages (on the 
theory that wages are merely a return of human capital to the taxpayer for his 
spent labor), their arguments have been summarily rejected.174  Even O’Gilvie, 
which proponents of the human capital theory say implicitly supports the 
theory for exclusion of personal injury damages, contains criticism of the 
rationale.  Justice Scalia’s dissent in O’Gilvie, which was joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Thomas, attempted to debunk the “return to capital” rationale of 
the early administrative rulings in and around 1918.175 
Even the Attorney General’s 1918 letter to the Treasury (relied on by many 
different entities thereafter in promulgating personal injury compensation 
policies) appears to improperly grasp the difference between an endowment 
and capital/basis in their technical tax meanings.176 Either that, or the Attorney 
General was looking at personal injury compensation through the res 
conception of income, equating personal injury to loss of trust corpus.  A few 
scholars have picked up on the Attorney General’s unsound or antiquated 
reasoning and argued that the whole rationale for the personal injury exclusion 
is unsound and should therefore be abandoned.177  This Comment is not so 
bold, but it does agree that the Attorney General’s reasoning was either 
fallacious or based upon a res conception of income that is no longer in use. 
In the Attorney General’s letter to the Treasury, the Attorney General 
analogized accident insurance for personal injury to fire and casualty 
 
 172. I.R.C. § 213(a) (2000) (allowing a deduction from gross income the cost of medical 
expenses actually acquired by a victim, a deduction which would likely have allowed Murphy to 
offset a portion of her $70,000 award-income although it is likely that Murphy was awarded a 
separate payment for future and past medical expenses for her injuries). 
 173. E.g., Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Garber, 589 
F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding blood includable as income under I.R.C. § 61); Green v. 
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980) (holding that sale of blood with rare blood type income under 
I.R.C. § 61, and that selling blood could constitute a trade or business). 
 174. E.g., United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 943–44 (3d. Cir. 1990); Coleman v. 
Comm’r, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986); Perkins v. Comm’r, 746 F.2d 1187, 1188 (6th Cir. 
1984); Lonsdale v. Comm’r, 661 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981); Cullinane v. Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. 
1192, 1193 (1999) (noting that “[c]ourts have consistently held that compensation for services 
rendered constitutes taxable income and that taxpayers have no tax basis in their labor.”). 
 175. See O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 97 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 176. See Hobbs, supra note 24, at 57–59. 
 177. Id. at 93–94. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
222 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVII:195 
insurance.178  From there, the Attorney General wrote that fire and casualty 
insurance proceeds were excluded from gross income because they simply 
restored the fire victim to his previous status quo.179  Returning the victim to 
their status quo resulted in a zero-sum situation of no gain or “accession to 
wealth,” or a simple neutralization of income and outcome.180  Therefore, 
because accident insurance for personal injury insurance also created a zero-
sum situation and a restoration to the status quo, no gain or accession to wealth 
(i.e., no income) was created.181 
Unfortunately, in this simple analogy, the Attorney General failed to 
correctly distinguish the two uses of the term capital.  One definition of 
“capital” denotes property while the other denotes a system of recording post-
tax expenses on a particular item for tax purposes.182  Even in 1918, the latter 
use of capital was well-known as the correct tax definition.183  It was also 
recognized that compensation proceeds for the value of destroyed property 
were only exempt from gross income to the extent the proceeds restored the 
insurance holder’s basis in his property.184  It is the distinction between 
restoring value and restoring basis that the Attorney General failed to grasp.  
Therefore, when he mischaracterized the nature of fire and casualty insurance 
proceeds to be excluded from gross income, the Attorney General also 
mischaracterized the distinction between compensating a personal injury 
victim for the value of his lost limbs from restoring the victim’s basis in his 
lost limbs.  This characterization is a subtle but vastly important distinction in 
the tax arena since a return of capital in the tax sense denotes a tax-free 
recovery of basis while any recovery of value exceeding basis is gain.185  This 
same line of reasoning is why the Code taxes endowments to the extent that 
compensation for the endowment exceeds a taxpayer’s basis in it.186 
 
 178. 31 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 304, 307–08 (1918). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 308. 
 182. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 184–85 (1918). 
 183. Id. at 185.  The court also stated that: 
[I]t cannot be said that a conversion of capital assets invariably produces income . . . . 
Nevertheless, in many if not in most cases there results a gain that properly may be 
accounted as a part of “gross income” received “from all sources.” . . . .  In order to 
determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any, we must 
withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that 
existed at the commencement of the period under consideration. 
Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See generally I.R.C. § 1001 (2000) and cross-referenced sections therein. 
 186. For example, if a taxpayer is gifted an antique vase, he takes the adjusted basis in the 
vase that the donor had (I.R.C. § 1015), but if it is later destroyed and he has insurance proceeds 
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It may be telling that the Murphy and O’Gilvie majority opinions both cite 
the Attorney General’s letter as support for the exclusion, and that both failed 
to recognize the Attorney General’s apparent fallacy.187  In fact, the Murphy 
panel used the letter as almost dispositive of whether personal injury 
compensation was income within the Constitution’s original meaning.188 
Insofar as some commentators have connected the Attorney General’s 
apparently fallacious letter to the impetus for the House Report for the 
Revenue Act of 1918, they advocate a total abandonment of the personal injury 
exclusion, even in its current “personal physical injury” form.189  This 
connection between the Attorney General’s 1918 letter, the Treasury’s 
Decision 2747, and Congress’s 1918 House Report was criticized by Justice 
Scalia’s O’Gilvie dissent.190  Coincidentally, or ironically, Justice Scalia’s 
dissent appears to partially discredit the human capital line of reasoning in a 
way that discredits professor Hobbs’s arguments against the human capital 
rationale.  However, this incongruity demonstrates that even among critics of 
the human capital rationale there is no consensus as to whether the Attorney 
General’s fallacious reasoning requires a total abandonment of the personal 
injury exclusion or the human capital argument. 
d. Concluding Remarks on Human Capital 
Regardless of the merits of the human capital theory, and whether one is a 
proponent or critic of it, two facts should be accepted unanimously.  First is the 
fact that the tortured history of the personal injury exclusion does not 
substantially support one side of the debate or the other, and therefore history 
alone should not be relied upon as the basis for either supporting or 
 
compensating him for the full value, any recovery in excess of the donor’s adjusted basis (plus 
any additional basis contributed by the taxpayer) will be includable in gross income. 
 187. In fact, while professor Hobbs’s arguments are quite convincing, no court dealing with 
the issue of personal injury exceptions has yet had occasion to use them. 
 188. Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79, 109 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 189. See generally Hobbs, supra note 24. 
 190. O’Gilvie v. United States 519 U.S. 79, 98 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting): 
So, to trace the Court’s reasoning:  The statute must exclude punitive damages because 
the Committee Report must have had in mind a 1918 Treasury Decision, whose text no 
more supports exclusion of punitive damages than does the text of the statute itself, but 
which must have meant to exclude punitive damages since it was based on the “return-of-
capital” theory, though, inconsistently with that theory, it did not exclude the much more 
common category of compensation for lost income.  Congress supposedly knew all of 
this, and a reasonably diligent lawyer could figure it out by mistrusting the inclusive 
language of the statute, consulting the Committee Report, surmising that the Treasury 
Decision of 1918 underlay that Report, mistrusting the inclusive language of the Treasury 
Decision, and discerning the Treasury could have overlooked lost-income 
compensatories, but could not have overlooked punitives.  I think not. 
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abandoning the rationale behind the personal injury compensation exclusion.  
That the Murphy panel found the history of the personal injury exclusion so 
dispositive on this issue was probably an error.  Second, opponents of taxing 
personal injury compensation should not rely exclusively upon a human capital 
rationale without preparing something else.  The human capital rationale flies 
squarely in the face of current-modern tax basis analysis.  Therefore, 
proponents of the rationale must be prepared to use outside rationale to either 
supplement or replace these human capital arguments when arguing against 
Congress’s power to tax emotional distress compensation.  The next section 
discusses a supplementary or alternative argument, in terms of fairness and 
equity. 
2. Tax Fairness and Equity in the Tax System: Sidestepping the Basis 
Issue 
While the human capital theory above attempts to squeeze itself into the 
modern technical tax system of gain, basis, capital, and accession to wealth, it 
fails to properly do so because its conception of capital is a misnomer that is 
more similar to endowment than tax basis.  Perhaps the more effective, or at 
least honest, approach by those scholars who oppose taxing personal injury 
compensation is to use the human capital argument in conjunction with a 
fairness and equity argument.  While the human capital argument attacks the 
classification of personal injury compensation as a “gain,” a fairness argument 
takes up the issue of whether traditional basis is or should be applicable to 
personal injury compensation, and also whether such compensation should be 
“gross income” at all. 
There are three fairness aspects of personal injury compensation that, taken 
together, should give tax analysts second thoughts as to the equity, prudence, 
and legality of taxing such compensation, especially when considered in 
conjunction with the human capital rationale.191  These three factors are: (1) 
the intimate and personal nature of certain personal injury compensation; (2) 
the non-marketability of personal injury rights; and (3) the involuntary 
conversion of such personal rights that occurs and leads to compensation.192  A 
combination of these factors creates a distinct something that is inadequately 
addressed in the Code, thereby creating an unfair result.  There is no case law 
directly addressing this issue, as it has only regained notoriety since 1996, as 
discussed above in Part II. 
 
 191. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 135. 
 192. Id. 
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a. The Code’s Inadequate Treatment of Personal Injury Compensation 
The problem with analyzing personal injury compensation under the 
Code’s modern tax definition of basis is that such compensation deals with (1) 
inherently personal rights that are often-times (2) unmarketable and (3) 
involuntarily taken from a victim.193  While the Code does in fact deal 
separately with both personal rights and involuntary conversions, it does not 
deal with them together (except to assume that they are taxable since not 
explicitly exempted in the Code).194  Non-marketability is an aspect the Code 
ignores completely.  This failure to consider these factors together (or at all) 
and to not later exempt them from income (via the post-1996 § 104(a)(2)) 
created the current problem in tax law.  The combination of these three aspects 
of personal injury compensation suggests a need to approach personal injury 
compensation differently than other types of compensation for basis 
purposes.195 
i. Inherently Personal Features 
One aspect of personal injury compensation taxation that is odious to 
prudential and just senses is the inherently personal thing that is being replaced 
or compensated for.196  One’s eyes, limbs, tears, happiness, and labor are all 
very personal attributes to which the individual attaches more than other 
material objects, such as cars, money, or jewelry.  Personal injury 
compensation is meant to replace such personal attributes when they are 
tortiously taken in order to return victims to their previous status quos.197  
Except for I.R.C. 104(a)(2), which distinguishes personal injury compensation 
based solely upon the physical or nonphysical origin of the injury, the Code 
treats inherently personal features no differently than it treats one’s car or 
house.198  Actually, the Code does distinguish between homes and cars on one 
hand and blood, emotions, reputation, and feelings on the other.  Amazingly, 
the Code treats personal features worse for tax purposes, since the Code 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2000). 
 195. Cf. Khan, supra note 3, at 135–37 (arguing that such arguments are merely value 
judgments, and therefore properly reserved for consideration by the legislature on mere policy 
grounds, not statutory or constitutional grounds).  See also supra Part IV.C.2.b. 
 196. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 135. 
 197. See generally Hubbard, supra note 141 (including a history of emotional distress 
compensation and its purposes); Laura Spitz, I Think, Therefore I Am; I Feel, Therefore am 
Taxed:  Descartes, Tort Reform, and The Civil Rights Tax Relief Act, 35 N.M. L. REV. 429 
(2005); Laura Quigley, Reparation Rights Tax Relief Restores Human Rights as a Civil Right in 
Tax Tort Reform, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 41 (2005); Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double 
Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1341 (2000). 
 198. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000). 
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precludes deductions for personal expenditures199 and does not attribute any 
basis to one’s person.200 
To be fair to the Code, just because an attribute is inherently personal does 
not mean that it cannot or should not be taxed.  After all, employee wages are 
technically compensation, given in exchange for the employee’s time, tears, 
leisure, sweat, and, to an extent, happiness and emotional well-being.  Modern 
economics is based on the premise that humans interact the way they do solely 
to maximize happiness (or utility).  No reasonable person, however, doubts 
that the Sixteenth Amendment’s conception of income is so narrow as to 
exclude compensation for labor as income.201 Furthermore, even the 
Macomber definition of income includes gains from “labor.”202 
Another line of cases that comes even closer to this “personal injury 
compensation” situation deals with the sale of human blood.  Blood is 
extremely personal and has no use other than for personal human benefit.  
However, courts summarily reject taxpayer arguments that compensation for 
their blood is not income under I.R.C. § 61 and the Sixteenth Amendment.203  
Proceeds from the sale of blood are completely taxable as income (since there 
is no basis in blood), while donations of blood to charitable organizations are 
not deductible as charitable expenses (again, because the Code does not allow 
people basis in their blood).204 
However, this Comment does not argue against the taxability of sales of 
one’s labor or blood.  In fact, sales of labor and blood are distinguishable from 
personal injury compensation on two grounds: labor and blood transactions are 
both freely marketable and done voluntarily.  This leads to the next point that 
personal injury compensation is often awarded to compensate victims for 
assets that are not freely transferable or marketable. 
 
 199. I.R.C. § 262 (2000). 
 200. See Lary v. Unites States, 787 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1986); Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 
1229 (1980); United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 201. Tax protestors often espouse a human capital argument in court to avoid paying taxes on 
their wages.  Consequently, the human capital argument in relation to wages has been summarily, 
and with much irritation, rejected by all courts.  See sources cited supra note 174. 
 202. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1919) (“Income may be defined as the gain 
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.”). 
 203. See Lary v. Unites States, 787 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1986); Green v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 
1229 (1980); United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 204. Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538, 1540–41 (11th Cir. 1986) (“In the instant case, 
section 170(e)(1)(A)’s limitation on charitable contributions precludes any charitable deduction 
for the value of the donated blood.  Taxpayers have proffered no evidence as to any basis in the 
donated blood . . . .”). 
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ii. Nonmarketability of Emotions and Other Personal Attributes 
A person’s eyes, arms, emotions, and psychological well-being are not 
marketable assets, which distinguishes personal injury compensation from the 
sale of blood and labor.  The second factor, non-marketability, which describes 
much personal injury compensation, is not mentioned explicitly in the Code at 
all.205 Yet, the I.R.S. claims to have power to tax all human eyes, ears and 
limbs upon some realization event.206  As in Murphy’s case, where she was 
compensated for emotional and psychological pain (and physical pain which 
was brought on as a result of her psychological trauma), she could not 
ordinarily have cashed in on her emotional well-being prior to having it stolen 
or destroyed (essentially what NYANG did here). 
The Code does not address this “marketability” factor because, for tax 
purposes, the marketability of an asset is apparently irrelevant.207  For the 
Code’s concept of income (distinguished, perhaps, from the constitutional and 
statutory definition of income) the only important questions to ask are what is 
the amount of monetary benefit (cash) and whether that amount exceeds the 
amount of post-tax dollars directly expended on the unmarketable item.  Again, 
the Code does not allow basis for personal attributes (not even the food and 
water that go into maintaining them) but instead treats body parts similar to 
endowments, with no post-tax dollars having been expended on them.208  
Remember, an analytical consequence of allowing a person to acknowledge 
post-tax dollar expenditures (basis) on their body and emotions could be to 
essentially make wages nontaxable as well as create a host of other 
deductions.209  Therefore, justifying that compensation for emotions and 
psychological well-being is not income under the Sixteenth Amendment and 
I.R.C. § 61 based solely on their status as nonmarketable assets would be 
disastrous for the current income tax system and irreconcilable with judicial 
precedents and the likely intent of the Framers of the Sixteenth Amendment.210 
 
 205. As is fairly obvious, inherently personal attributes are mostly nonmarketable, with some 
exceptions, such as reputation/goodwill, blood, hair, and labor, all of which are clearly 
marketable inherently personal assets. 
 206. See infra Part IV.B.2.iii. 
 207. See Kahn, supra note 3, at 133; Hubbard, supra note 141, at 764–65. 
 208. See, e.g., Lary v. Unites States, 787 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1986); Green v. Comm’r, 74 
T.C. 1229 (1980); United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 209. For example, personal deductions for anytime a person is unhappy, depressed, or 
emotionally or physical unwell, whether or not it is the fault of someone else or whether or not a 
legal suit is initiated and won. 
 210. For instance, it would be ludicrous to allow taxpayers to take tax deductions on the 
water, food, and shelter expenses that are necessary for keeping themselves healthy and happy.  If 
that were the case, the wealthiest and most extravagant spenders would be allowed the most tax 
deductions.  This is just one consequence of such a broad exclusion from income. 
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However, despite the harm that a principle based on non-marketable status 
might do to the state of the income tax system, it seems intrinsically unfair and 
inequitable to tax Americans on inherently personal attributes that could not 
have been, and would not be, exchanged for cash equivalent, but for the 
intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct of some tortious actor.  This moves 
the Comment along to the final factor that, together with the inherently 
personal attributes and non-marketability factors make the taxation of personal 
injury compensation unfair, imprudent, and probably unconstitutional: that 
these assets are involuntarily converted. 
iii. Involuntarily Converted Assets 
The last factor that makes taxing certain personal injury compensation 
odious is the involuntary conversion that occasions such compensation.  As in 
Murphy’s case, where NYANG effectively stole her peace of mind and caused 
extensive emotional pain and anguish, personal injury compensation goes to 
victims who have had their personal rights violated and their assets harmed by 
no choice of their own.  Many times, the only thing the victims can do is go to 
court and get compensated monetarily.  This factor further distinguishes the 
case of sales of blood and labor, where the compensation is for voluntary acts. 
Unlike the former two factors listed above, the Code explicitly deals with 
involuntary conversions.211  For the Code, conversions of property are 
realization events and make previously unrealized gain taxable at that point.212  
This concept inherently makes sense, in the context for which it usually 
applies.  For instance, if a person owned a house for twenty years, and it burns 
down, it is likely the homeowner will be compensated for the fair market value 
of her house at the time it burned down.  However, since the time she 
purchased her house, twenty years prior, the property likely appreciated in 
value.  When she receives her insurance compensation, any gain would 
normally become realized and taxable.213  When this conversion principle is 
applied to the incidents of personal injury compensation, it means that the 
victim is about to get taxed.  The I.R.S. has no qualms about applying this a 
conversion principle to cases involving mental and physical anguish of victims, 
as the Murphy case shows. 
To counteract what at first appears to be slightly unfair for the victim of an 
involuntary conversion, who probably did not want to recognize a gain and 
cannot replace her home exactly without the pre-tax sum of insurance 
proceeds, the Code includes a deferment mechanism for gain in the form of 
 
 211. I.R.C. § 1033 (2007). 
 212. Id. 
 213. If she were not taxed on amount of insurance money that exceeded her adjusted basis in 
her home, she would make an untaxed profit off of the destruction of her home, which is not fair 
when compared to those who sell their homes voluntarily (I.R.C.§ 121 aside). 
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I.R.C. § 1033.214  Section 1033 allows taxpayers to defer gains realized upon 
some involuntary conversions, under certain specific conditions.215  Important 
to this article is the specific condition that the proceeds from the compensation 
be converted back to “property similar or related in service or use to the 
property so converted.”216  This requirement effectively excludes victims of 
personal injury from deducting any of their compensation from gross income. 
There is nothing “similar or related in service” to “emotional happiness” that 
Murphy can buy with her compensation that would allow her to qualify under 
IRC § 1033.217  A car accident victim cannot buy himself another arm or 
another set of eyes if he loses them in a car accident.218 
This Comment does not criticize the current section 1033, but only points 
out the obvious, that such a section is not appropriate to deal with inherently 
personal attributes.  However, the existence of I.R.C. § 1033 is an 
acknowledgement that involuntary conversions should be dealt with in a 
manner different than voluntary conversions.  The “similar or related in 
service” requirement merely strengthens the notion that our income tax system 
does not force citizens to pay taxes on circumstances that are by and large not 
their fault and not their own doing.  The involuntary conversion of personal 
injury victims’ physical, emotional, and psychological well-being is especially 
egregious, because such victims would NEVER have converted their emotions, 
body, or psyche to monetary form but for the actions of some liable person. 
Section 1033’s deferment mechanism works to correct a situation where a 
taxpayer would have paid taxes on his gain anyway, so no tax revenue is lost, 
only postponed.  This Comment advocates for a total nonrecognition of such 
personal injury compensation as income and in that respect this Comment 
 
 214. I.R.C. § 1033 (2007) (“If property (as a result of its destruction in whole or in part, theft, 
seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof) is compulsorily or 
involuntarily converted [i]nto property similar or related in service or use to the property so 
converted, no gain shall be recognized.”). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. While Murphy could not use her compensation to buy emotional happiness, she could of 
course use it to buy a vacation to the Bahamas, where she would undoubtedly cope with her 
mental anguish better.  However, a vacation is likely not closely “similar or related in service” 
enough to meet section 1033 standards.  Nor is a “medical vacation” allowable as a deduction 
under I.R.C. § 213 (deduction from gross income for medical expenses), via 26 CFR 1.213-
1(e)(1)(ii), which states, “an expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health of an 
individual, such as an expenditure for  a vacation, is not an expenditure for medical care.” 
 218. Of course, prosthetic limbs are available and are allowed as deductible medical expenses 
in I.R.C. § 213 of the Code.  See Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (stating that 
“[d]eductions for expenditures for medical care allowable under section 213 will be confined 
strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental 
defect or illness.  Thus, payments for the following are payments for medical care: . . . artificial 
teeth or limbs.”). 
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diverges from I.R.C. § 1033’s principle of “later, but not never.”219  However, 
the fairness and equity rationale that underlies I.R.C. § 1033’s deferment 
nonetheless adds credibility to a policy of total nonrecognition of gain for 
personal injury compensation.  In a sense, any other conclusion would 
advocate for a perverse situation in which tortious individuals build the 
government coffers by injuring people; this is because the Constitution does 
not allow Congress the right, without apportionment, to tax people for their 
arms, legs, and emotions in and of themselves.220  Had victims not been 
FORCED to convert their personal attributes to compensatory damages 
because of civilly liable individuals, they never would have realized income in 
the first place!221  It is these three factors, all present in personal injury 
compensation, which warrants their separate treatment as non-income in the 
constitutional, statutory, and common-sense meaning of the word. 
iv. The Three Factors Together 
Personal injury compensation that involves personal attributes that are non-
marketable and converted involuntarily from the victim cannot be, under any 
standard of fairness and equity, taxable.  As demonstrated above, it is the 
interplay between these three factors together that ensures a court ruling that 
held personal injury compensation nontaxable and not subject to the normal 
gain rules of realization over basis would not be readily exploitable in a much 
larger sense.  Individually, these factors do not make a compelling argument 
against taxing personal injury compensation.  Instead, it is the combination of 
all three factors together that compel a different result. 
Removing personal injury compensation that meets these three 
requirements from the realm or definition of income would not impact tax 
revenue in any significant way.  Presently, physical personal injury 
compensation and all compensation stemming from it (punitive damages 
aside), is already completely excluded from gross income via I.R.C. § 
104(a)(2).222  The discussion is really only concerned with damages for 
emotional distress, personal reputation, and other psychological damages that 
accompany various tort and tort-like suits.  Furthermore, the non-marketability 
 
 219. I.R.C. § 1033 (2007). 
 220. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”). 
 221. One can imagine the editorial cartoon in the newspaper where a sneaky, bureaucratic, 
top-hatted I.R.S. tax collector is plotting with the mean, gruff, jail-suited villain to injury the 
poor, gentle, unsuspecting victim taxpayer so as to then reap the tax revenue from any ensuing 
civil settlement!  It is a disturbing, yet theoretically sound, (even if practically ridiculous) picture 
of the taxman taxing one’s tears.  Although, it would not be the first negative depiction of the 
I.R.S.; if you would like to see a few other cartoons depicting tax issues comically, see 
www.cartoonstock.com/directory/t/tax_collector. 
 222. I.R.C. §104(a)(2) (2007). 
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factor accompanying most personal injury situations means that the federal 
coffers are not losing out on anything that would have become taxable outside 
of some faulty person’s actions. 
Admittedly, requiring a personal injury exclusion to meet these three 
factors would leave out some otherwise popular categories of “personal 
rights.”  For instance, while professional and personal reputations (i.e. 
goodwill) are personal attributes, they are nonetheless marketable in many 
situations.  Therefore, under this Comment’s fairness concept of income 
personal injury compensation meant to restore one’s personal and professional 
reputation would be subject to taxation, for failing to meet the second factor, 
unmarketability.  However, tort compensation for pain and anguish, mental or 
physical, would indeed not be income under this meaning; mental and physical 
pain and anguish are inherently personal attributes, not marketable, and were 
involuntarily forced upon a victim. 
b. Likely Criticisms and Responses to a Fairness Limitation on Income 
Advocating for a fairness limitation on Congress’s power to define income 
(at least, in the case of personal injury compensation) is bound to run into more 
than a few criticisms. 
First, a most obvious criticism is that income definitions are best left to 
Congress.223  Again, this advocates for Congress to use its plenary power to 
define income; but this violates the notion of a limited government with checks 
and balances and a constitution.224  Particularly on point is the Supreme 
 
 223. See e.g., Kahn supra note 3, at 135; Thuronyi supra note 3, at 100. 
A constitutional definition of income in terms of tax equity would recognize that as long 
as Congress is striving to impose a tax based on the relative annual financial positions of 
taxpayers, according to its concept of fairness, the Court should not overturn its 
determination.  The sixteenth amendment [sic] should be read as authorizing just such a 
legislative exercise. . . .  Under such an approach the concept of income would be an 
elastic one, since it could accommodate virtually any congressional definition of income. 
Id.  Marjorie Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income Taxation of 
Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1, 24 (1992). 
Given the broad underlying purpose of the taxing power generally, a proper reading of the 
Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a fully vested power to tax all income, 
however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine distinctions. Such an 
interpretation yields a meaning of income that is broad and evolutionary. Income's 
meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the Court, and that meaning changes over 
time as congressional conceptions of income change and become more sophisticated.  A 
broad definition of income also harmonizes with the Court's understanding of the balance 
of power among the three branches of government and its vision of the judiciary's 
function in a regulatory state as one of deference to the legislative and executive branches. 
Id. 
 224. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 1087–91 (arguing that simply deferring to Congress to the 
meaning of income without any supervisory role violates the notions of having the Sixteenth 
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Court’s holding by Justice Brandeis in Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins 
that, “Congress cannot make a thing income which is not so in fact.”225  
“Congress cannot by any definition [of income] it may adopt conclude the 
matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it 
derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power 
can be lawfully exercised.”226  Because Congress cannot simply define as 
income that which is not income, some parameters inherent in the Sixteenth 
Amendment’s conception of income surely must exist.  A parameter based on 
fairness principles is not totally out of the question.227 
A second criticism of this three factored fairness test for non-income is that 
fairness is itself so amorphous as to be impossible to set firmly into a standard.  
While a complete all-encompassing definition of fairness might be 
unattainable, there should be little doubt that fairness has played and continues 
to play a fundamental part of the income tax system in the United States.  One 
fairness principle replete in United States income tax history and 
implementation is that the government does not tax heaviest the poorest and 
most downtrodden.228  Taxing personal injury compensation does exactly that; 
it burdens victims who have been deprived of their personal rights and leaves 
them only partially restored to their previous status quo. 
A third potential criticism is the implementation and administration of such 
fairness principles.  In relation to personal injury compensation, critics charge 
that separating the compensation for injury is often difficult to distinguish from 
the lost wages, punitive, and other liquidated damages229 and that juries are ill-
equipped to judge the value of pain, anguish, and psychological suffering.230  
However, this objection has long been dismissed, as judging personal injury 
values for physical pain and mental anguish is accepted as a risk of providing a 
 
Amendment and the Constitution, as well as our branched system of governance, allowing 
lawyers and Congress to disregard legal texts and avoid courts of law). 
 225. Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass’n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110, 114 (1925); see also Taft v. 
Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929) (stating that the “settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth 
Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without apportionment 
something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income.”). 
 226. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 199, 206 (1920). 
 227. See generally Thuronyi supra note 3. 
 228. See, e.g., Jensen supra note 3, at 1091–1107 (discussing the history of the 1894 income 
tax, the Sixteenth Amendment, the populist party movement, and the general push for a 
progressive system of taxation that removed the heaviest burdens of tax from the ones least able 
to pay it). 
 229. E.g., Kahn supra note 3, at 136 (“There is great difficulty at arriving at the correct 
amount of monetary award that approximates the personal loss that a victim has suffered.”). 
 230. Id. 
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legal remedy to a legal wrong.231  In any event, excessively large jury awards 
are reviewable by courts.232 
A final argument that has been espoused is that fairness and equity actually 
mandate for taxation of personal injury compensation.233  The argument is that 
many people suffer tortious personal injury suffering.  However, only some are 
so “lucky” to be compensated for it.234  Allowing a tax deduction for those 
compensated in effect makes the two groups of people (i.e., those compensated 
and those not compensated) unequal, which is unfair.235  While this argument 
is at first insulting and ridiculous to the eyes and ears of anyone reading or 
listening, politeness and thoroughness mandates that it be addressed.  All that 
need be said is that those who attain redress in court had such a right to redress.  
They were not “lucky”; they were entitled to such compensation, on the basis 
that they had been legally harmed.  It is a fundamental principle that those who 
suffer legal harms are entitled legal remedy (or do tax professionals ignore the 
basic precepts of our legal system as related in Marbury v. Madison236 just as 
they are so willing to ignore the Sixteenth Amendment?).  For any law 
practitioner to accept such an argument is to concede defeat that our system 
strives to give legal redress to those legally injured.  Just because our system of 
justice is not perfect does not mean that the tax system should encourage or 
exploit its imperfections. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In December 2006, once the Murphy rehearing was scheduled and the 
initial decision vacated, it became fairly apparent to this author that, in all 
likelihood, Chief Judge Ginsburg and the other two panel members would rule 
against Murphy.  After all, why would the panel have vacated their prior 
 
 231. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 55 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 232. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 233. E.g., Deborah A. Geier, Murphy and the Evolution of “Basis,” 113 TAX NOTES 576, 582 
n.25 (Nov. 6, 2006) (“Many others have noted the difficulties in articulating a satisfactory rational 
for . . . [personal injury] exclusion . . . . [I]t is hard to justify why the most fortunate subset of 
injured parties – those fortunate enough to receive a recovery of some sort—should be the ones 
blessed with a tax benefit.”); Thuronyi supra note 3, at 90–91 (making the argument that those 
lucky enough to be compensated for their personal injury are in effect better off than those who 
are not compensated, since it would be ludicrous and unmanageable to allow a tax deduction to 
those who are personally injured but not compensated.  In effect, this would make the two injured 
persons (one compensated legally, the other not compensated) unequal and therefore violate 
equity precepts). 
 234. Thuronyi supra note 3, at 90–91. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that 
right is invaded.”). 
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decision if not just to decide the matter differently and keep it out of taxpayer 
briefs and future court opinions (where it would undoubtedly fester as an open 
sore)?  The second Murphy decision contains language more deferential and 
broader than any other court case on the subject of income.237  Under all of the 
negative criticism and pressure from tax articles and tax scholars, Chief Judge 
Ginsburg’s buckling is understandable.  His buckling is also unfortunate.  
Some things are too solemn for Congress to tax so arbitrarily. 
It was the hope of this Comment to instill in readers the notion that 
Congress cannot simply make up whatever it likes as a constitutional definition 
of income.  It was a second goal that readers could see, through the brief 
histories set out in the paragraphs above, the changing conceptions of income 
and personal injury compensation that have existed throughout the country’s 
history.  After this reading, it should be apparent that personal rights to one’s 
body and emotional-well being were not income as the Framers conceived the 
term, nor are they income now, in the twenty-first century.  While society has 
moved past a stale definition of res income to a more dynamic and evolving 
definition under Glenshaw and Haig-Simons, there are still certain things, such 
as psychological health and human physical attributes, which Congress must 
leave solemn.  This author’s position is, of course, the minority view.  
However, as the concept of income has proven, even unfair notions of what is 




 237. Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[Income] extend[s] to all 
economic gains not otherwise exempted”; “Section 61 encompasses all accessions to wealth”; 
“Section 61(a) includes Murphy’s award in her gross income regardless whether it was an 
accession to wealth, as Glenshaw Glass requires. . . .  In other words . . . [Congress] can label a 
thing income and tax it, so long as it acts within its constitutional authority . . . .”). 
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